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Abstract: This article is an attempt to apply the basic principles of the aesthetic discourse 
on the sublime, beautiful and grotesque to William Shakespeare's The Merchant of 
Venice. Even though it is a discourse that only begins in the course of the eighteenth 
century, I will argue that the structure of the play parallels the model of the traditional 
sublime, as it deals with a subject-object binary and meditates on the relationship 
between the material (body) and the transcendental (mind). However, the play is also rich 
in disruptive — or grotesque — forces that unsettle this binary structure. The parallels 
between the play and the aesthetic discourse could not only help our understanding of 
postmodern criticism and rewriting of the sublime, but the sublime can also, in turn, 
shed light on the reception of the play. 
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[A]stonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some 
degree of horror.! In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot 
entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it. Hence arises 
the great power of the sublime, that far from being produced by them, it anticipates our 
reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force.  
—Edmund Burke1 
William Shakespeare has often been associated with the sublime, either when being 
called a ‘sublime writer’, or in his capacity to trigger sublime feelings in his 
spectators/readers. Harold Bloom, in his latest book, Anatomy of Influence, for 
example, thinks that:  
[t]he difference between reading Shakespeare and reading nearly any other writer is that 
greater widening of our consciousness into what initially must seem a strangeness of woe or 
wonder. As we go out to meet a larger consciousness, we metamorphose into a provisional 
acceptance that sets aside moral judgment, while wonder transmutes into a more imaginative 
understanding.2 
Venerations of Shakespeare of this kind have become all too familiar; they evoke 
ideas of genius and tradition, but they also carry the hope that sublime writing 
would somehow raise us through metamorphosis into a larger consciousness 
through the power of forming great conceptions.3  The sublime would have the 
quality, as Bloom puts it, to transport and enlarge, so that the reader would 
experience ‘something akin to authorship’.4 As conveyed in Burke’s and Bloom’s 
passages, the sublime is generally conceived as the coupling of crisis and 
transcendence. When encountering a special kind of object that is so all-
encompassing that it fills the subject completely, judgment is put aside, and ‘motions 
are suspended, with some degree of horror’, as Burke writes. The experience of 
perceiving the object, thus, is so overwhelming that it throws the subject into crisis. 
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This ‘irresistible force’5 of the experience eventually leads to some form of 
transcendence — it enlarges, raising the perceiver to something grander. 
The sublime is an emotional experience with a long discursive tradition. 
Although it mainly emerged in the seventeenth century, emotions do not just appear 
with their discourses; they are already in the world. Likewise, thoughts on the 
sublime have been around since before the seventeenth century. Originating in 
Ancient Greece, the treatise On the Sublime, for instance, is generally attributed to 
Longinus. Contrary to widely held assumptions, ‘its early modern revival did not 
begin with the adaptation published by Boileau in 1647; it was not connected solely 
with the early Greek editions that began to appear from 1545; nor was its impact 
limited to rhetoric and literature’.6 It was present in art and architecture, philosophy, 
religion and anthropology, and should therefore not be reduced to literary discourse 
only; since before 1750, it escaped easy disciplinary classification.7 Edmund Burke, 
Immanuel Kant, and William Wordsworth were later all preoccupied with the 
sublime, as were modernist and post-modern writers and philosophers such as 
Theodor W. Adorno, Jean-François Lyotard, or Patricia Yaeger. The history of 
discourses around emotions can remind us of their social character as well as of their 
central role for thought and creativity. 
Shakespeare’s plays are valuable texts for examining emotions because they 
provide insight into their historical context, test their credibility for contemporary 
audiences and, thus, offer insight into the social life of emotions. However, this 
article aims to demonstrate that our current post-modern discourses can also 
illuminate early modern plays and their emotional content. It thus claims that the 
sublime can be a fruitful category that frames Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice in 
a new light. The first part of this article considers Romantic and post-modern 
discourses on the sublime to gain a structural understanding of the play and 
analyses its inherent power relations as well as its dynamic of crisis and 
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transcendence. I will propose that while the play can be read along the principles of 
the traditional sublime, it equally disturbs this order through potentially ‘grotesque’ 
encounters with its ‘others’; namely Shylock and his daughter Jessica. The second 
part of this article investigates the sublime as an emotion evoked in Act V that can 
speak to a (post)modern audience and generate new meanings for the play. 
 My discussion builds on post-modern rewritings of the sublime by writers 
and scholars such as Julia Kristeva, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Jennifer Wawrzinek, 
who have tried to rework a more ethical version of this emotional experience. The 
existing body of theory hopefully enables a fresh reading of The Merchant of Venice, a 
play that has not yet been conceived of in terms of the aesthetics of the sublime, 
beautiful and grotesque.  
 
READING THE PLAY WITH THE BASIC  
PRINCIPLES OF THE SUBLIME 
One of the main issues the discourse on the sublime negotiates is the relationship 
between subject and object. The sublime experience narrates an encounter with an 
object or an ‘other’ too vast to grasp, followed by an overpowering emotion of terror, 
pain and pleasure, which Burke considers to be ‘the strongest emotion which the 
mind is capable of feeling’.8 Burke describes a certain sequence of events in this 
experience. First, the excess of the encounter fills the perceiver so completely that the 
faculty of judgement is blocked, and language fails: ‘In this case the mind is so 
entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence 
reason on that object which employs it’.9 This encounter is accompanied by a 
negative pleasure, a delightful horror which, through its forcefulness, threatens to 
annihilate the subject. As a consequence of this crisis, writers such as Immanuel Kant 
and William Wordsworth have described the subsequent transcendence of the mind 
over ‘matter’, which experiences a kind of epiphanic new consciousness that has the 
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quality of a revelation.10 This heightened sense of the self not only sublimates the 
disturbing emotion, but also forms the ground for a strengthened ego through a 
newly acquired concept. Often, this transcendence has taken the form of a 
celebration of human faculties that are superior to the object of contemplation. For 
Kant, these powers would lie in human reason. Wordsworth, on the other hand, 
would find them in the human imagination. A striking example for the process of 
transcendence described can be found in Wordsworth's encounter with a blind 
beggar in the streets of London:  
Amid the moving pageant, ‘twas my chance  
Abruptly to be smitten with the view  
Of a blind Beggar, who, with upright face,  
Stood, propped against a wall, upon his chest  
Wearing a written paper, to explain  
The story of the man, and who he was.  
My mind did at this spectacle turn round  
As with the might of waters, and it seemed  
To me that in this label was a type,  
Or emblem, of the utmost that we know,  
Both of ourselves and of the universe;  
And, on the shape of the unmoving man,  
His fixèd face and sightless eyes, I looked,  
As if admonished from another world.11 
Rather than pondering the social circumstances that might have triggered his misery, 
or else seeking a dialogue with the suffering man, the poet transforms the blind 
beggar into a type that in the coming verses helps the reader attain new knowledge 
of the world and the poet's relationship to it.  
Not only does the outcome of the Kantian or Wordsworthian sublime 
strengthen binaries, but the conclusions drawn after this unsettling experience are 
also hierarchical, for they articulate a valorisation of some kind, be it in mind over 
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body, reason over imagination, imagination over reason, autonomous self over 
contingent other, human over nature, and so on.12 Because of this hierarchical 
transcendence with its implied mastery over something designated as ‘other’, the 
Kantian sublime has been criticised for reinforcing subjectivity based on 
individuality and autonomy, and for objectifying the perceived other.13 Whether 
through identification with or in contradistinction to the other, the object is 
subordinate and merely functions as a foil for the strengthened human subject. 
Transcendence of the subject is oblivious of the context, difference and singularity of 
the perceived other, whose sole purpose of existence seems to be determined 
through the capacity to be of use to the perceiver, the human individual. Thus, the 
traditional sublime encounter relies on a strong separation of subject and object, in 
which the reality of the object is only of abstract value and serves an intellectual goal.  
 In a similar way, The Merchant of Venice is constructed around a strong binary 
of subject and object, a logic following the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dynamic the play 
establishes between the white Venetian Christian identity versus Shylock ‘the Jew’, 
and other ethnically different ‘intruders’ of Venice and Belmont. The radical 
objectification of Shylock becomes apparent through the fact that he is the only 
character who falls into generic labelling; often he is simply designated ‘the Jew’. 
Further, Venetian Christian identity is in crisis throughout the play, as can be seen 
through Portia's mainly foreign wooers and her scepticism towards them; Antonio's 
vulnerable white Christian body subject to Shylock's knife; and through the play's 
preoccupation with conversion and miscegenation as brought to play through Jessica 
and Launcelot the clown.14 But with the help of a forensic trick, Shylock is outplayed, 
and eventually in Act V, Venetian identity is restored.  
 This basic plotline illustrates the principle concerns of the sublime, for it is the 
story of a fragile identity (white Christian Venetian) that finds its unity threatened 
upon the confrontation with an othered opponent (Shylock, Jessica, and other 
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‘ethnic’ intruders), but eventually manages to colonise this objectified other 
transcending and condemning it. The vertical transcendence over the material reality 
of the other (materiality meaning here the context and singularity of the objectified) 
happens with the help of a gained concept; in this case Christian spiritual superiority 
as expressed throughout the trial scene as well as through the idea of musicality in 
Act V. This potentially sublime experience therefore leads to religious, aesthetic, or 
racial supremacy, so that transcendence is exposed as a potentially violent act. The 
play, however, also harbours ‘grotesque’ elements that can be said to disrupt the 
structure of the transcendental sublime. 
 
GROTESQUE IRRUPTIONS 
The grotesque has been associated with the bodily, the abject, and the ‘low’. The 
Jewish moneylender, against whom Christian identity is continuously constructed, is 
marked out by the play through his increasing grotesqueness. It is worth considering 
how this difference is constructed theologically and aesthetically in order to examine 
the significance of the grotesque in relation to the sublime.  
 Shylock’s difference is delineated with the help of Christian supersessionist 
interpretations of Judaism. As Janet Adelman points out in her book Blood Relations, 
the play reflects the balancing act Christians underwent. On the one hand they 
recognised their religious source of Judaism, while on the other simultaneously 
displacing this ‘father religion’, claiming it as a religion of law, rather than 
forgiveness.15 Adelman remarks that this rejection of Judaism implied a paradoxical 
argument: on the one hand, it maintained that Jesus would be the rightful, physical 
descendant of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, while on the other hand, it emphasised that 
Christianity is the rightful spiritual inheritor of Judaism; spiritual, for it is open to all 
peoples of the world no matter of which ‘blood line’ and because it replaces a 
supposed ‘religion of law’ with spiritual values, such as mercy, forgiveness and 
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love.16 Adelman uses the following Paulinian passage to illustrate this paradoxical 
struggle for Christians:  
all they are not Israel, which are of Israel: Neither are thei all children, because thei are the 
sede of Abraham...they which are the children of the flesh, are not the children of God: but the 
children of the promes are counted for the sede. (Romans 9.6–8)  
Adelman thus points out that the Christian exegesis of the Bible reserved the 
material world to the ‘older brother’ Judaism, while claiming the rightful spiritual 
position of the ‘younger brother’ for themselves. This passage is not only telling for 
the objectification at hand, but also for the body-mind divide which serves a 
hierarchical structure. Adelman observes: 
the fleshly descendants of Abraham are to be displaced by sons of faith – and these sons of 
faith come to be typologically represented by none other than Isaac and Jacob, the fleshly 
ancestors of Christ. Issac and Jacob are thus called upon simultaneously to represent both the 
Jews from whom Christ descends in the flesh and the triumph of Christian spiritual lineage 
over Jewish fleshly lineage.17 
 Likewise, Shylock's grotesqueness seems to be grounded in his objectification 
as the representative of Judaism with its supposed material preoccupations with law, 
money, and the pound of flesh. This is constructed in contrast to the Christian 
Venetians’ self-fashioning as carriers of transcendental ideals of mercy, morality, and 
music. A short example from the trial scene demonstrates this:  
Portia:   ‘Twere good you do so much for charity. 
Jew:   I cannot find it; ‘tis not in the bond. (IV. 1. 269–270) 
 The grotesque has been associated with the bodily and the ordinary, as well as the 
vulgar, all of which seem to be implied in Shylock’s wish for the dubious ‘pound of 
flesh’, implicitly alluding to Antonio’s genitals.18 
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 Further to this theological categorisation, Shylock is also constructed as an 
aesthetic typecast by his fellow Venetians, for he is said to be ‘the man that hath no 
music in himself’. As Lorenzo thinks:  
The man that hath no music in himself,  
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,  
Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils,  
The motions of his spirit are dull as night,  
And his affections dark as Erebus:  
Let no such man be trusted: - mark the music. (V. 1. 83–88)  
Since musicality is linked to the capacity to be moral as well as spiritual in the play, it 
is conveyed that Shylock is mentally and physically incapable of morality, as he has 
‘no music in himself’ and is ‘not moved with concord of sweet sounds’ (V. 1. 83–84). 
Implicit in this is his alleged inherent wickedness and the ‘primitivism’ that the 
Christians come to despise in the play and which they claim to have transcended 
long ago with their belief in Jesus. Shylock is the ultimate objectified other, who is 
loaded with theological concepts, symbols and aesthetic categories that easily slip 
into a racial construction of difference.  
 We have now seen how Shylock is both theologically and aesthetically 
constructed by the Christian Venetians as ‘grotesque’. As the play unfolds, however, 
Shylock seems to increasingly fit into this image of the grotesque Jew that the 
Christians have reserved for him. To this extent, he even wishes his beloved 
daughter’s death after she has eloped with a Christian, bemoaning the jewels she 
took with her (‘I would my daughter were dead at my foot, and the jewels in her 
ear’; III. 1. 79); and it culminates in his whetting the knife on his shoe in the 
courtroom, hoping for his desired pound of flesh (IV. 1. 121–126). He increasingly 
becomes a monstrous figure that perfectly fits into a definition by Janeen Webb. 
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 Aside from an imaginary animal or a misshapen variant of a recognisable form, a 
monster can be ‘a person twisted (by such wickedness, cruelty or fanaticism) or 
otherwise damaged so that he partakes in the inhuman’.19 
With the building up of his monstrosity, Shylock progressively functions like a 
mirror that reflects the cruelty committed to him by the Christians, who make use of 
him by borrowing his money, while despising him for doing exactly this. Shylock’s 
famous soliloquy expresses his intention to replicate Christian behaviour:  
If you prick us do we not bleed? if you tickle us do we not laugh? if you poison us do we not 
die? and if you wrong us shall we not revenge? – if we are like you in the rest, we will 
resemble you in that. If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is his humility? revenge! If a Christian 
wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Christian example? – why revenge! The 
villainy you teach me I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the instruction.  
(III. 1. 57–65)  
Similar to Mary Shelley’s creature (which is often referred to as ‘monster’) in 
Frankenstein, Shylock is holding a mirror to the society that produced his malice; he 
‘de-monstrates’ that his opponent Antonio is, indeed, just the same in his unrelenting 
hatred towards the Jews: ‘The villainy you teach me I will execute, and it shall go 
hard but I will better the instruction’ (III. 1. 65). This interchangeability of Christian 
and Jew culminates in Portia’s strangely salient question when she enters the 
courtroom as a judge: ‘Which is the merchant here? and which the Jew?’ (IV. 1. 172).  
The term ‘monster’ originates from several noun and verb-forms, as Mark 
Thornton Burnett explains: ‘In Latin, monstro means to show, demonstrate and 
reveal; a monstrum is a portent, prodigy or sign as well as an ‘unnatural thing’; and 
moneo translates as to give warning of or presage’.20 The category of the monstrous 
would therefore be useful for its quality of subsuming ‘alterity’ of many kinds, under 
which would fall not only the physically ‘different’ but also ethnic ‘others’.21 Burnett 
discusses Shakespearean characters such as Caliban (physically different), Cleopatra 
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(her appropriation of male power) or Othello (ethnically different) for describing the 
versatile faces of the monstrous, and how it came to signal ‘a range of personality 
and behavioural traits which fall outside prescribed perimeters’.22 He claims that in 
Shakespeare’s time, representations of the monstrous were circulating widely, and 
that monsters occupied a firm space in the early modern psyche, making it ‘the most 
intriguing and least understood discourses of the period’.23 Shylock, however, has 
rarely been associated in terms of the grotesque or monstrous; Burnett does not 
mention him at all.  
Shylock’s threatening ‘grotesqueness’ seems to have the virtue of destabilising 
Christian identity, for he becomes an over-determined figure that in its de-
humanised monstrosity puts Christian stereotypes on display. As Burnett observes, 
the monstrous body always seems to be an object of fascination because it produces 
anxieties about sameness and difference, autonomy and dependency, singleness and 
doubleness, civility and savagery.24 The development of his character, as well as 
Jessica’s fraught relationship to him, thus show the potential of being a ‘monstrous’ 
man. However, this potential also precariously reiterates the image of the abject 
Jewish body. Maik Hamburger has pointed out that the split between aesthetic and 
political effect makes it impossible to follow the play’s affective potentials without 
being confronted with the accusation of racism.25 The play’s dilemma, therefore, 
seems to be that Shylock’s implied grotesqueness perpetuates anti-Semitic imagery.    
 We have now seen how the grotesque is connected to the idea of the bodily, 
the abject, the ‘low’, how Shylock is constructed as theologically and aesthetically 
grotesque, and how he also seems to play up to this role with his increasingly 
‘monstrous’ behaviour. But how exactly has the grotesque been conceived of as an 
aesthetic category and how does it relate to the sublime? The grotesque is excessive, 
irrational and hybrid; it is uncontainable. While Kant had pronounced the 
monstrous incompatible with the sublime for the defeat of intellectual end by 
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material form,26 many postmodern critics place the abject or the grotesque alongside 
the sublime and the beautiful — as a third often forgotten aesthetic category.27 The 
grotesque becomes crucial among post-modern critics precisely for its potential to 
unsettle circumscribed identity, binary thinking and, above all, because it 
discourages a transcendence that leads to the colonisation of the other through a 
concept. In her book Powers of Horror, for example, Julia Kristeva defines the abject as 
that which ‘does not respect borders, positions, rules’.28 Because the abject has the 
quality of throwing the subject into crisis by not withholding the neatly 
circumscribed subject-object relationship, she aligns it with the sublime:  
The abject is edged with the sublime. It is the same moment on the journey, but the same 
subject and speech bring them into being […] for the sublime has no object either.29  
She thus writes about a sublime encounter with ‘abjection’:  
The abject has only one quality of the object – that of being opposed to I. [...] the jettisoned 
object, is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses.30  
The abject encounter described is so ultimately strange to the perceiver that it cannot 
be assimilated into symbolic structures, such that it threatens to unsettle the subject 
in its defiance of conventional, instrumental sense-making. While describing a 
sublime encounter that leaves the subject moved and unstable, Kristeva omits the 
transcendental part of encountering an object. Rather than drawing conclusions that 
reinstate the self, the encounter unsettles identity, as meaning collapses and 
intellectual transcendence is defeated. It is because of this different conclusion to a 
disturbing contact with an ‘other’ that the grotesque has been restored in 
postmodern revisions of the sublime. 
Placed in opposition to Christian moral spirituality, Shylock’s grotesqueness 
also has the potential to disrupt the smooth surface of Christian Venetians’ alleged 
superiority. His development into an embittered hyperbolic ‘monster’ can 
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deconstruct the religious and aesthetic categorisations including the assumption that 
Jews lack certain human qualities like mercy, for example. René Girard asserts that 
the play is obsessed with ‘sharpening a difference that is less and less real’, a quality 
which he finds characteristic of all of Shakespeare’s works.31 This disturbance 
between self and other lies in the uneasy sense that Antonio and Shylock — the two 
wealthy men who are somehow marked out as ‘different’ to the majority of society 
— are mirrors for each other. Adelman comments on the disruption of subject and 
object in the play: ‘Theologically, the knowledge that Merchant simultaneously 
gestures toward and defends against is that the Jew is not the stranger outside 
Christianity but the original stranger within it’.32 The aesthetic of the grotesque 
seems to negotiate its own kind of excessive encounter, in which identities mingle, 
intersect and therefore transcendence over a designated ‘other’ is debarred.  
 Because of the kinship of the two religions at stake, and because the play 
negotiates questions of personal, national and religious borders, Adelman points out 
that preoccupation of The Merchant with the two religions hinges on questions of 
‘bloodline’ and spirituality, and tells of anxieties about the Christians’ unpaid debt to 
the Jews.33 These anxieties are not only mediated through Shylock and his Christian 
opponent Antonio, but also through Jessica, Shylock’s daughter. As a Jew converting 
to Christianity, her own body becomes a field in which definitions of Judaism and 
Christianity are practised: is this young woman, Shylock’s flesh and blood, with her 
maternal body, her so-called ‘Jewish womb’, an acceptable figure within the 
Christian community?34 Is she welcomed among her new Christian brothers and 
sisters? The play demonstrates that her fellow Christians have great trouble 
accepting her as their like: Portia mostly ignores Jessica, while Gratiano marks her as 
different by calling her an ‘infidel’ (III. 2. 217) and a ‘stranger’, which awkwardly 
points to the way in which Jessica is physically excluded on stage: ‘cheer yond 
stranger. Bid her welcome’ (III. 2. 236).35 In fact, Jessica’s conversation with Launcelot 
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the clown anticipates this outsider position she cannot escape even after having 
converted, as Adelman has pointed to:36 
 Launcelot:   Yes truly, for look you, the sins of the father are to be laid upon the children, 
[...] therefore be o’ good cheer, for truly I think you are damn’d; there is but 
one hope in that can do you any good, and that is but a kind of bastard hope 
neither.  
 Jessica:  And what hope is that I pray thee?  
 Launcelot:  Marry, you may partly hope that your father got you not, that you are not the 
Jew’s daughter. (III. 5. 1–9)  
As Launcelot explains to her, Jessica is pre-destined to remain excluded for her only 
hope would be not to have descended from a Jewish bloodline. Jessica thus becomes 
a liminal figure that, similar to Shylock, exposes the Christians’ failure of treating 
their spiritual sister any different after she has renounced her father’s heritage and 
changed her religion. This liminality is not only due to her status as a convert, but 
also happens by virtue of her femininity, for the prospect of her conceiving a child 
with a Christian has the capacity to irritate the neatly circumscribed white Christian 
Venetian identity.  
 Thus, the extermination of difference, the attempt to turn the ‘other’ into the 
same, is not only disrupted through the potentially complex grotesqueness of 
Shylock, but also through the seemingly marginal figure of Jessica, who has the 
capacity to disturb identities through her status as a convert, and by sheer virtue of 
her femininity — her prospect of being a future mother. Does this give her character 
a grotesque potential? It is certainly for directors to decide how to play her and to 
play with potentials in characters. In any case, it is she who, next to Portia, marks the 
play’s melancholic last act and who — although having converted — continues to 
irritate Christian identity, especially after her father has been expelled. As the 
following section discusses, the last act reveals Jessica’s subtle defiance to play into a 
harmonic end of this ‘comedy’. 
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CHRISTIAN TRANSCENDENCE 
The play’s conclusion, Act V could be understood as the silence after the storm. It is 
marked by the ostensible absence of ‘others’ and presents us with the concept of 
Christian transcendental spirituality. This happens by means of a discourse on music 
through which positions and lessons learned are, somewhat abstractly, expressed. 
Music is literally played over the conspicuous silence of the night which seems to be 
the silence of the sentenced, the absence of ‘others’. Lorenzo, Jessica’s newly-wed 
husband, claims:  
In such a night as this,  
When the sweet wind did gently kiss the trees,  
And they did make no noise (V. 1. 1–3) 
Although the wind stirs the trees, they do not respond. Their silence is uncanny. 
Lorenzo here seems to point to Jessica’s silence and the way she does not respond 
positively to the ‘sweet music’ of the last act. For Lorenzo, this ‘sweet music’ plays a 
great part as the expression of grand ideals, such as the beautiful and harmonious 
which enables morality and transcendence:  
Lorenzo:  Such harmony is in immortal souls 
But whilst this muddy vesture of decay  
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it. [...]  
Jessica:    I am never merry when I hear sweet music. (V. 1. 70–73; 76)  
With its evocation of rising above materiality and those beings that are apparently 
not sensitive to music, the concept of music conjures a form of the traditional 
sublime, as a transcendental ideal is expressed at the cost of those that are identified 
as other. Lorenzo instructs his melancholic wife, Jessica, about the concept of 
spherical harmony which clearly establishes the binary between materiality and 
spirituality. Jessica, however, seems to refuse an understanding of transcendence that 
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happens in differentiation to her father, who apparently is the one alluded to in 
Lorenzo's utterance ‘[t]he man that hath no music in himself’ (V. 1. 83). She claims 
she would be ‘never merry when I hear sweet music’ and thus reveals her sadness 
after her father has been expelled by alluding to ancient tragic myths of unhappy 
women, and by falling silent after her above statement (V. 1. 76).  
 Likewise, Portia displays a remarkable sadness in this last act that is meant to 
celebrate Venetian Christian self-restoration and the beginning of her marriage:  
This night methinks is but the daylight sick  
It looks a little paler; ‘tis a day,  
Such as the day is when the sun is hid. (V. 1. 124–126)  
Portia seems to remark here on the fact that day and night are not so much opposites 
as versions of one another; the night merely resembles a dim day; it is characterised 
in terms of lack and illness — it is ‘sick’, ‘pale’ and ‘hidden’. The night is thus not an 
entity in itself with moon and stars, but characterised in terms of what is missing. 
Further, Portia embarks on a reflection of the circumstantial and relative, in contrast 
to Lorenzo’s absolute categories of harmony and morality through music37:  
Portia:  Nothing is good (I see) without respect –  
                   Methinks it sounds much sweeter than by day.  
Nerissa:    Silence bestows that virtue on it, madame  
Portia:      The crow doth sing as sweetly as the lark  
                  When neither is attended: and I think  
                  The nightingale, if she should sing by day  
                 When every goose is cackling, would be thought  
                 No better a musician than the wren!  
                  How many things by season season’d are  
                  To their right praise, and true perfection! (V. 1. 102–8)  
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Nothing is good ‘as such’, she claims, everything depends on the perspective of the 
perceiver. Here, the nightingale may only be loved because of the appearance of her 
song at a particular time of the night. Ruth HaCohen has remarked that the play 
hinges on the question of whether Shylock’s wicked behaviour is the result of an 
‘original sin’, or whether it is the circumstances of Venetian society that have led him 
to his monstrosity — a question Portia seems to resolve in favour of the latter, as she 
criticises a notion of a fixed morality or truth.38  
This brings us back to the theory of the sublime and grotesque, for the 
grotesque specifically conveys the defiance of absolutes in favour of a material 
reality of context, of time and space. As Jennifer Wawrzinek remarks: ‘[T]he 
grotesque belongs to time and space, rather than the supersensible world of the 
sublime. It insists upon a body that is open and incomplete and which exists within 
a social and ecosystemic network’.39 Shylock’s grotesqueness holds the potential of 
seeing his otherness in context, thereby serving to demystify and de-demonise his 
alterity. Despite — or perhaps because of — Portia’s role in Shylock’s harsh 
punishment (which in fact seems to be his death sentence), she seems torn and 
unsatisfied in the concluding act of the play. ‘Nothing is good without respect’ (V. 1. 
102); and even the dark creatures, crows, can be regarded as singing beautifully — 
depending on the context.  
 
THE OTHER SUBLIME 
After Portia rids music of appropriation and exclusivity, such as who possesses 
proper sounds, the playing of music over the silence of the sentenced has the 
potential to express the inherent melancholia in the play’s conclusive fifth act. This 
act attempts to celebrate the transcendence over Shylock; yet, as mentioned above, 
Portia claims that the night is ‘pale’ and resembles a dark day. The night of this final 
act is not an entity in itself with moon and stars, but is characterised in terms of lack, 
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of what is missing. The sense that something has gone missing evokes the idea of 
melancholia which Sigmund Freud describes in his seminal essay ‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’ (1917). He defines it as a condition in which one is unable to declare the 
object of sadness dead. Freud contrasts this condition with mourning, finding that 
mourning is the healthy, unrepressed process of letting something go. When we 
mourn there is an end in sight, he claims; it is a process with a successful outcome: 
the object of sadness is finally released and the ‘I’ learns to live on. Melancholia, in 
contrast, entails a feeling of loss that cannot be determined and, therefore, not 
overcome. The ego, in this case, cannot enjoy ‘the satisfaction of knowing itself as the 
better of the two, as superior to the object’.40 Freud thus seems to designate 
melancholia with a failure of transcending the object of sorrow, so that the loss of the 
object taints the self, and results in what he claims to be an unproductive emotion. 
The melancholic fifth act seems to revolve around a missing object, but is 
never able to refer to it or name it. We know, of course, that the end of the play needs 
to be seen in relation to Shylock’s condemnation: the character who, previously an 
important agent at the play’s core, is never mentioned explicitly again in Act V. It is 
therefore possible to say that instead of celebrating the rise over difference by having 
successfully shaped it as the same, the play’s final scene is shaped around an obvious 
absence. The striking melancholia of Act V thereby points to the failure of absolute 
transcendence. In this way, it seems to speak to the unsettling effect the colonisation 
of its Jewish characters has had on the Christian Venetian’s subjects. That is, Act V 
stages the realisation that the stranger is no longer without. 
In her book Strangers to Ourselves, Kristeva offers a theory of modernity 
circling around the tension between union and separation — something that Act V 
anticipates. Kristeva describes the anxiety that arises when trying to distinguish 
between what is one’s ‘home’ or people, and what is not.41 Similarly, the play circles 
around the tension of self and other, and dramatises society’s investment with 
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strangers, which both enable and disable the exclusion of ‘foreigners’. This 
ambivalence comes to the fore with the expulsion of Shylock and the supposed 
integration of Jessica. Kristeva proposes to recognise the stranger in ourselves by 
internalising and individuating it: ‘The foreigner is within us. And when we flee 
from our struggle against the foreigner, we are fighting our unconscious — that 
“improper” facet of our impossible “own and proper”’.42 This disquieting realisation 
is seemingly embodied in the play through Jessica. Functioning as a kind of 
placeholder for her father, her apparent discomfort in Belmont — a white Christian 
Venetian society — is expressed through her defiant position to Lorenzo’s theory on 
music, as discussed above. There seems to be no satisfying conclusion, no harmony 
and no redemption possible after her father has been expelled, as this melancholic 
last act reveals.  
The failure of absolute transcendence over Shylock is not only delivered by 
the seemingly melancholic women, but also by Antonio — Shylock’s mirror image, 
and the person who does not pair up at the end of this ‘comedy’. It is he who sets the 
melancholic tone and whose melancholia never gets resolved and therefore leaves 
plenty of space for speculation (unrequited love for Bassanio is the most commonly 
conceived). The play opens on his melancholic note: 
In sooth I know not why I am so sad. 
It wearies me; you say it wearies you; 
But how I caught it, found it or came by it, 
What stuff ‘tis made of, whereof it is born, 
I am to learn; and such a want-wit sadness makes of me, 
That I have much ado to know myself. (I. 1. 1–6) 
This evocation of a ‘disease of the mind’ evokes Freud’s interpretation of 
melancholia, in which the object of sadness is not known and can thus not be 
mourned: ‘But how I caught it, found it or came by it, / What stuff ‘tis made of, 
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whereof it is born, I am to learn’ (I. 1. 4). It further evokes the ‘strangeness to oneself’ 
that Kristeva points to: ‘That I have much ado to know myself’ (I. 1. 6). In this 
context, it is interesting to note that it is Antonio who is Shylock’s most important 
hater and opponent, his mirror image whose hatred Shylock swears to replicate. 
Thus, the unhappiest character also seems the most relentless in his hatred towards 
the great ‘other’ of this play. It is as if the melancholia of the last act after the 
transcendence over Shylock has infected other characters too.  
With the discourse on transcendental music and beings that are or are not 
receptive to it, it is possible to say that Act V centres on the emotions of the sublime 
and melancholic. To Jean-François Lyotard, these are the most characteristic 
aesthetics of modernity, which would describe a different kind of sublime 
experience:  
[…] modern aesthetics is an aesthetic of the sublime, though a nostalgic one. It allows the 
unrepresentable to be put forward only as the missing contents; but the form, because of its 
recognizable consistency, continues to offer to the reader or viewer matter for solace and 
pleasure. Yet these sentiments do not constitute the real sublime sentiment, which is an 
intrinsic combination of pleasure and pain: the pleasure that reason should exceed all 
presentation, the pain that imagination or sensibility should not be equal to the concept.43  
What is nostalgic in modernity is an unnamable ‘missing content’, as Lyotard 
suggests. What has gone missing is the concept under which Lyotard understands 
the grand meta-narrative. It might be worth recalling Longinus’ text from ancient 
Greece mentioned earlier, in which the sublime was precisely defined as the ‘power 
to form great conceptions’.44 Lyotard, however, describes the sublime as an 
experience in which representation must necessarily fail, for ‘the imagination fails to 
present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept’.45 In the 
postmodern criticism of the sublime, it is the grand concepts or the totalitarian meta-
narratives that are no longer possible. The sublime would thus be an emotional 
experience that refutes transcendence. It is not the ‘real sublime sentiment’ — by 
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which Lyotard seemingly refers to the traditional sublime of Romantic discourse — 
but a new kind of sublime, a (post)modern sublime which tells of the sense that there 
is no totalising concept possible anymore, as objects are always bigger than what we 
can know about them. The Merchant seems to exemplify just that: a potentially 
sublime attempt at overcoming an ‘other’ that results in a melancholic conclusion. 
However, the colonisation ends with unsettled subjects, in the sense of an 
unnamable loss and the realisation of failure, as Act V suggests. The unsettling 
repercussions of Shylock’s grotesque development, as well as Jessica’s status as a 
convert and potential Jewish/Christian mother, seem to have successfully disrupted 
the smooth unity of white Christian Venetian society. The emotional household of 
this play seems so effective because it foreshadows modernity and its catastrophic 
investment with supposed ‘strangers’. 
  
CONCLUSION 
At the precise point where emotion turns into sound, on that articulation between body and 
language, on the catastrophe-fold between the two, there looms up ‘my great rival, music’.46 
As I hope to have shown, one fundamental emotional experience potentially at stake 
in The Merchant of Venice is the sublime. The last act in particular is concerned with 
questions of sublime transcendence, and of the perceived conflict between body and 
mind, between the grotesque and spiritual transcendence. The playing of music in 
Act V can convey several things, such as the failure of language, sublime supremacy 
— as wished for by Lorenzo — or for articulating the emotional residue of the 
conflict with Shylock: melancholia. The literal playing of music in this conclusive act 
thus has the power to determine the emotional outcomes of the play, as ‘emotion 
turns into sound’.47 It is up to directors to decide how to play this part. However, the 
striking melancholia inherent in the text emphasises that in this conclusion, smooth 
reconciliation is debarred and transcendence out of this negative emotion 
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impossible. Some characters are left unsettled, they cannot be ‘merry’ when they 
hear ‘sweet music’. As Portia and Jessica suggest, they refuse to rise with music over 
difficult events. Others remain silent altogether — the melancholic Antonio hardly 
plays a part at the end.  
This process is also helped through the virtue of possible grotesque 
encounters in the play, including those with Shylock and Jessica. The grotesque 
stresses relativity and context over absolute ideas and judgements which leads to the 
awareness that ‘otherness’ always exists in relation to what it deviates from. The 
grotesque in relation to the sublime speaks of the necessity to consider the material 
reality of the other, and in doing so, warning of supersensible meta-narratives that 
happen at the cost of the marginalised. It speaks of the wish to de-demonise alterity 
as well as the necessity for otherness to exist in its own right, rather than to be seen 
as a means to an end or a mere disturbance that needs to be overcome for achieving 
human greatness. Therefore, this aesthetic can trigger an earthbound, non-
transcendent, but nevertheless transformative state. Act V conveys that no 
redemption is possible, as transcendental supremacy and absolute understanding 
become debarred, or an excess of meaning fails to be grasped in the realisation that 
the stranger is within. This gains particular relevance for a post-Holocaust, 
postcolonial audience. When considering accentuations and angles for 
interpretations, directors ultimately have to decide on the relevance that the 'other', 
the grotesque, or the abject takes in the symbolic structure of the play, for these 
aesthetic questions seem to be inextricably linked with ethics.  
  In the light of the aesthetics discussed, it is interesting to examine the history 
of reception of the play, such as the one from post-War Germany, which I will only 
briefly touch on here. Markus Moninger has remarked that every post-War staging 
of Merchant inevitably evokes Auschwitz.48 This assertion has been problematised by 
Sabine Schülting and Zeno Ackermann, who have discussed the precarious 
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implications of staging the play in terms of post-Holocaust remembrance in 
Germany.49 Moninger’s observation remains undeniable; the association cannot be 
thought away. It seems fair to say that the discourse on transcendence and music in 
the last act hold potential for new meanings generated in the context of a post-
Holocaust audience. As Ackermann has analysed, the play was remarkably popular 
in West Germany for the first sixteen years following the war for its capacity to 
confront the immediate past in a somewhat distanced, abstracted form; but also for 
the play’s potential — if played with a certain accentuation — to celebrate a restored 
Venetian identity and provide the needs of a shattered national collective.50 Many of 
these post-War productions would place their emphasis on the musical and romantic 
aspect of the play as well as on Portia’s supposed genius at restoring harmony 
through mercy. Ackermann stresses that this interpretation was working in 
contradistinction to Shylock, for the rehabilitation of the German national collective 
happened at the cost of a renewed (symbolic) exclusion of the Jewish figure.51 He 
concludes about the end of this early phase of post-War German productions 
between 1945 and 1961:  
Indeed, the confrontational figure of Shylock eventually proved more potent than the 
compensational plot of the play, so that performances of Merchant actually renewed the need 
to face what early productions had been quite eager to forget. In the long run, it proved 
impossible to simply ‘play’ the recent past ‘away’.52 
With its over-determined figure, the play has often triggered confusion between 
ethical and aesthetic problems, and as Ackermann analyses, has proven to escape 
reconciliatory ends that would enable a smoothly harmonious German 
remembrance.53  
 The text of the play itself indeed squares off against a cathartic, transcendental 
ending as wished for by some Venetians. When considering the context of a post-
War German audience and the evocations generated by Shylock’s trial, the inherent 
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melancholia as well as the playing of music over the silence of the sentenced, might 
speak of the crisis of transcendence over historical events, or finding a concept that 
would match the rupture in civilisation committed during the Shoah. However, it is 
easy to play over nuances in Shakespeare’s complex and poetic texts, and so 
Lorenzo’s and Portia’s attitudes to music in Act V could be read quite differently in 
the immediate post-War period on the West German stage. In the German context, 
the way that transcendence over Shylock is played out immediately gains political 
significance. 
 A sublime that disables supremacy and a renewed harmonious community 
based on some kind of deeper connection could protect society’s ‘others’ from being 
instrumentalised, from being seen as a necessary sacrifice or a means to an end. The 
Merchant seems uncanny in its foresight; in its ability to speak of the past and a 
haunted present in a playful, embodied form. 
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